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The purpose of this paper is to consider whether financial regulatory structures are well-
matched to the needs of growing, changing and integrating financial markets in Asia.  
Key to this story is the extent of regulatory restrictions on the activities of different 
financial institutions and the match (or mismatch) between the supervisory structures and 
the developing structure of the market. 
 
The paper examines the changing size, shape and range of financial markets in the region 
indicates the extent to which regional markets have become more efficient and have 
improved in quality since the financial crisis.  One question of importance is whether 
Asian markets are following the developing trends towards integrated financial service 
provision and consolidation that is observed in other countries.   These trends raise 
several issues for efficiency and fragility of financial systems everywhere and the paper 
reviews some of the empirical evidence on these links.  The paper also discusses the 
arguments for and against particular supervisory structures in the face of new market 
developments.  Finally we consider whether supervisory structures are or should be 
moving towards unified supervision of these multi-function institutions and whether the 
supervisory structures are consistent with greater financial integration in the region. 
 
Section I 
Comparing financial systems 
 
Deepening of markets 
Financial systems around the world differ in many respects and comparing them is 
fraught with difficulty.  Allen and Gale ( 2004) note that comparisons should be made 
across many dimensions, recognising the many functions of financial systems.  Size of 
markets, measured by assets of particular categories, is only one aspect.  They also add 
the allocation of household and firms’ assets and liabilities by type, the size and number 
of institutions, the portfolio allocations of institutional investors and aspects affecting the 
transmission of monetary policy, such as the operation of mortgage markets and the 
formation of house prices.  Each of these comparisons is informative about different 
aspects of a financial system and avoids the temptation to label systems simply as “bank 
dominated” or “market oriented”.  Furthermore, these quantitative measures and labels 
say little about the efficiency and stability of financial systems which, at the end of the 
day, is what we care about most.    
 
Starting with simple quantitative measures, Asian financial systems have grown and 
deepened significantly since the crisis of 1997-98.  Recent World Bank data (Ghosh, 
2006) show that asset growth has been remarkable across the bank, equities and even 
bond markets.  By comparison with countries of similar income levels Asian markets are 
of comparable or larger size (Table 1 and Figure 1) 
 
 
Table 1  







Source, Ghosh 2006, p 27 
 
 
Observers frequently note that bond markets are still small relative to other types of 
finance and that the growth of bond markets has come mainly from public bond issues 
(frequently to restructure ailing banking systems).   Comparisons across a wider universe, 
however, show that variations in the size of bond markets are marked across developed 
markets as well – the role and function of bonds appear to be a major source of difference 
in financial markets across the globe.  Corporate bond markets remain very small in the 
UK and Japan as well as non-Japan Asia (see Allen, Chui and Maddaloni, 2004, figure 2).   
The fact that bank assets still make up a relatively large share of many Asian countries 
financial systems is also not unusual in global terms.   
 
Ghosh notes  
“Despite the progress made in diversifying financial markets, the banking sector remains 
dominant, accounting for around 58 percent of the region’s total financial assets at the end of 2005 (down 
from 63 percent in 1997)” (p 27)  
but also shows data that imply that Asian countries (with the exception of China) are 
mostly not far from global averages in the ratio of bank assets to other assets when 
adjusted for per capita income levels  (see Figure 2) 
 




Consolidation and Diversification  
 
Considerable consolidation and changes of ownership structure have taken place in all 
countries except China.  Numbers of banks have fallen in almost all countries and 
concentration ratios have generally risen.  Immediately after the crisis, state ownership of 
banks rose significantly but by 2004 state ownership of the largest banks had fallen in 
most countries, though Indonesia and Thailand still have high levels.    Importantly, 
foreign ownership has risen substantially (although IMF data suggests that the share of 
total bank assets owned by foreign banks in the East Asian region declined by 5% 
between 1995 and 2002, falling from a share of 18.4% to 13.4% (see IMF 2004, Table 3, 










 Table 2   
 




In 2001 the IMF International Capital Markets Report noted that while the general drivers 
towards consolidation in global markets are the impact of globalisation, deregulation, 
liberalization of barriers to cross border entry, increased competition and the effect of  
technology on banking margins and profitability, in the case of Asia much consolidation 
has been driven by government  reaction to financial crises,  rather than market forces.   
Despite this observation there has been a number of private-led mergers as shown in 















 TABLE #  
 
Source:  Ghosh, 2006, Appendix 1, p 185 
 
IMF (2001) reported (Table 5.2, p 127) that although consolidation was taking place at a 
rapid rate the impact on concentration was lower than expected.  Herfindahl-Herschman indices either rose less than would have been expected on the basis of the market shares 
of the pre-merged entities or, in the case of many Asian countries, actually fell, indicating 
an improvement in competition.  Some of this may have come from the increased share 
of foreign-owned banks in many countries.  On the other hand, Laeven (2005) constructs 
a measure of the degree of monopoly power (the sensitivity of output prices to input 
prices) and concludes that most Asian banking markets display oligopolistic competition 
and that they were more competitive in 1994 than in 2004.   
 
Another key issue of concern about banking diversification these days is to do with the 
integration of financial service business within banks (which is discussed further below) 
but it should not be forgotten that banking diversification is reflected not only in non-
banking sources of income but in the range and type of customers and lending activitiy.  
In the region post-crisis banks are lending more to governments and households and less 
(than in pre-crisis years) to the corporate sector.  The health of the corporate sector 
balance sheets has also improved although there are reportedly still some large corporate 
customers with high debt/equity levels.  This type of diversification should make banks 
less vulnerable to financial fragility in any one sector of the client base.   On the other 
side of this pattern is the observation that banks are not financing corporate investment, 
which has still failed to recover to pre-crisis levels, to the extent they previously were.   
 
Efficiency, and performance  
 
Efficiency of the banking sector has  improved in terms of costs, NPLs, return on assets 
and capital  adequacy (although data limitations and cross-country differences in 










Source: Ghosh, 2006, p 66 
 
One question is whether the improved efficiency comes from changes in the structure of 
the banking system itself.  If the consolidation described above results in economies of 
scale this might explain the efficiency improvements.  IMF 2001 argues that there is little 
evidence of economies of scale for banks in the Asian economies of Korea, Malaysia, the 
Philippines and Thailand.  Whereas evidence across a wide range of developed markets 
suggests that maximum economies of scale for banks are reached at asset sizes around 
US$10 billion (on more recent data the maximum may be reached in the range $10-25 
billion) , the Asian banks achieve modest efficiency gains in the range $1 to $10 billion 
but decline thereafter.   
 
Laeven (2005), using more recent data in a regression analysis, finds no significant effect 
for increases in size on efficiency (though he does not test for non-linear effects).   




Ghosh and Revilla, 2007, examine securities markets in the region to assess their quality.  
Several aspects -  liquidity, transactions costs and informational quality -  are considered. 
They create an index of market quality using two indices; one of market liquidity and one 
of the information quality of the market.  The informational quality index captures three 
measures from the World Bank Doing Business indicators i.e disclosure, director liability 
and shareholder suits.  These three are taken to measure the strength of minority 
shareholder protection. Combined with the liquidity measure these create a composite 
index of market efficiency that indicates that most of the regions markets are well below average standars.  Figure xx shows some international comparisons.  Ultimately the 
information quality of the markets is demonstrated by lack of synchronicity (i.e. the 
ability to distinguish individual movements of stocks within the market.  In explaining 
the outcomes on information quality they find that some institutional arrangements matter 
but many that might be expected to have an effect do not appear important.  Amongst 
their determinants disclosure rules are very important but so are  the availability of stock 








Source:  Ghosh and Revilla, 2007, p 11 
 
Insurance and other financial services  
 
It is not easy to get data on the size of markets for the whole range of financial services 
that now exist in developed countries so it is difficult to tell to what extent markets in 
Asia have expanded in sophistication and range of services.  One indicator is the size of 
assets of institutional investors in the different segments of the market as shown in Table 


















Ghosh, p 130 
 
 
A particularly  important indicator is the development of the insurance industry since it 
acts not only as an alternative savings vehicle in many of these markets but also as a risk-
sharing mechanism.   The most commonly used measures to assess the level  of 
development of the sector are insurance penetration  (measured as the insurance premium 
as a percentage of GDP) and density (measured as the premium per capita). As Ghosh 
notes,  “There is still substantial scope for further  development, particularly in China, 
Indonesia, the  Philippines, and Thailand (Table 6.6).  Distribution channels are an 
important factor in increasing the coverage of insurance. In most insurance markets in the 
region, distribution has been built on the agency sales-force model, often extending to 
large numbers of sales forces (with varying degrees of productivity, reflecting the extent 















 TABLE 5 
 
Source:  Ghosh, p 139 
 
The alternative model for extending insurance is for banks to market insurance products.  
This model, known as bancassurance, developing rapidly in Europe, is also appearing in 
Asia.   
 
A recent conference described the situation:   
“Bancassurance in Asia has been a relatively recent phenomenon, drawing increasing 
attention as a rapidly growing distribution channel for insurance only since 2002. 
Notwithstanding its short history, bancassurance penetration in the region has increased 
tangibly to capture market shares in excess of 20% of life premium in the more 
developed bancassurance markets within Asia”.   (6








Diversification and Integrated Financial Service Provision 
 
Diversification of activities across different sectors of the financial industry has been a 
global phenomenon, increasingly observed in Asia as well.  Banks have increasingly 
engaged in a variety of financial activities, providing new products and services that were 
previously not provided or were provided by non-bank financial institutions.   
 
Discussion of the relative merits of allowing banks to engage in activities other than 
“pure banking” goes back to the early part of last century.  The consensus view in the US 
after the Great Depression, represented by the passage of the Banking Act of 1933 
(Glass-Steagal), was that it was safer to legislate for the complete separation of banking 
and other financial activities.  This attitude persisted in the US despite the existence of 
other models of banking in equally successful advanced, industrialised countries such as 
Germany, which allowed “universal” banking.  The repeal of  Glass-Steagal and its 
replacement by Gramm-Leach-Bliley in 1999 was partly achieved because of  empirical 
evidence suggesting that even in the US the alleged dangers of the universal banking 
model had been exaggerated (see Bentson, 1994 and  Barth et al, 2000) and they had not 
played a crucial role in the Great Depression.    
 
Because of this history, the US still lags other countries in the development of integrated 
financial services providers and the growth of financial conglomerates and financial 
holding companies.  Elsewhere in the world the tendency to consolidation, 
conglomeration (or “convergence”) and globalisation is very marked.  Financial 
institutions are merging, both within markets and across borders, and are taking on a wide 
range of activities within conglomerated entities.  The key drivers for the trend are 
usually identified as changes in regulations prohibiting cross sector activities, growing 
substitutability of different financial products (for example the savings product character 
of many insurance products), growing demand by customers for integrated provision of 
financial services from one provider, and new technologies that reduce the cost of 
providing multiple products, that allow marketing information to be provided easily to 
more customers and that also reduce the value of proprietary information that banks have 
on customers.   
 
Models of integrated financial provision vary widely.  They range from the full universal 
bank, which can provide all kinds of financial product, service and advice, to institutions 
that combine some but not all activities (e.g the crossing of banking with insurance in the 
bancassurance model, or the provision of securities and banking activities together).  
Some countries still insist on complete separation of all activities and maintain specialist 
banking alongside separate activities in other markets.  In addition, even when banks are 
permitted to do the full range of financial activities there are several business models 
from delivery via wholly, or partly, owned subsidiaries to full conglomerates or financial 
holding companies.   The result is not only a blurring of the boundaries of type of financial product (is an insurance contract a “saving” product or not?) and service but 
also of type of institution.  Furthermore, new technologies have introduced entirely new 
players into financial markets, with the advent of internet-only banks, banking activities 
by supermarkets and other retail outlets and the introduction of e-money and stored value 
cards by providers ranging from car-park operators to railways.   
 
These developments raise a number of questions about the impact of financial structure 
on the efficiency of the financial sector, the development of financial markets and 
financial stability and for the appropriate regulatory structure.  A similar set of issues is 
raised by the related, but conceptually separate, issue of bank – commerce links (i.e. the 
ability of banks to own non-financial companies and vice-versa) 
 
Claessens (2003)  notes the difficulty of finding data on the extent of integrated financial 
services provision even globally but particularly in emerging markets.  He makes the 
point, however, that although banks and banking services appear to dominate the 
financial landscape in emerging markets it does not follow that IFSP is not occurring.  
Some of the integration occurs through provision of multiple services in a single 
institution but frequently it occurs through elaborate cross-ownership structures in 
financial groups (often family owned or conglomerates such as Korean chaebol and 
Japanese keiretsu).  Such financial conglomerates have frequently been both common and 
important in the development of emerging financial markets.  Ghosh (2006) records that 
at the end of 2003, of the 200 largest financial firms in the region, 111 are conglomerates, 
accounting for 80 percent of the total assets of those top 200 firms (p 170, no source is 
give for this data).   
 
How much is happening in Asia? 
 
There is little data on the extent of convergence activity across financial sectors at a 
macroeconomic, or even, industry level.   Occasional industry surveys provided 
snapshots but the best source is bank accounting data.  For international comparisons this 
can be problematic since accounting procedures differ and coverage is limited to those 
banks (usually only the listed, public companies) that are required to disclose information.  
This means excluding smaller banks, credit cooperatives and mutuals. Further, it gives no 
information on the extent of the provision of integrated services by non-banks since there 
is no comparable data on securities companies, insurance houses etc.   However, Table z 
shows that there has been some increase in diversified activity in most Asian economies, 
taking banks’ income diversification index to comparable levels to the UK and Germany.   










TABLE 6  
 
Source:  Ghosh, 2006, p82 
 
The diversification index is calculated as   
 
1 – abs(net interest income – other operating income)/total operating income  
 
so that if interest income and other sources of operating income are exactly equal, the 
index will be one, indicating perfect diversity.  Any imbalance of income will reduce the 
index.
2   
 
Another view of the scale of the issues posed by financial conglomerates is given by IMF, 
2004, reproduced as Table 7 below.  This data shows that Asia is not significantly behind 








 TABLE 7 
 
What are the pros and cons of integrated provision of financial services?   There appear to 
be no studies of the costs and benefits of the trend to integrated services in emerging 
markets and few studies of the related, but narrower, question of the advantages of 
universal banks (Claessens, 2003).   The key advantages of universal banks are usually 
claimed to be the exploitation of informational advantages (economies of scope), that 
they can economise on skilled labour (which may be important in developing countries 
with skill shortages), that they can engage in corporate restructuring more efficiently  
because of their specialised knowledge of clients and that they may be more stable 
because they can diversify risk. On the other hand, the fears are that universal banks will 
face conflicts of interest, will increase the volatility or fragility of financial systems, that 
by concentrating financial power they will restrict competition and innovation and that 
they pose special challenges for supervisors and regulators.   
 
A growing body of literature addresses several of these issues for universal banks 
(although most of the work is for developed, industrialised countries).  Conflicts of 
interest are common in finance, even in systems with specialised institutions but it is 
argued that integrated providers have greater opportunities to take advantage of 
specialised information and to abuse customers (these may take many forms, for example, 
banks promoting the securities of their borrower firms over better alternatives or banks 
unloading poor securities for which they are underwriters into other investment vehicles 
that they manage, at the expense of investors).   Claessens surveys some evidence (Lehar 
and Randl, 2001; Gande, Puri, Saunders and Walter) that tends not to support the abuse 
of conflicts of interest.  On the other hand, Ber, Yafeh and Yosha (2001) find that 
universal Israeli banks, while bringing  better quality firms to market, significantly 
underprice their IPOs and when shares are bought by bank-managed funds they tend to 
pay too much.  They interpret this as evidence of conflict of interest between bank lending, underwriting and fund management.     There is, however, little evidence to 
support the claim that universal banks limited competition in those markets where they 
had a long history, such as Germany.   
 
The impact of diversification on the performance of financial systems can be  assessed by 
direct evidence on economies of scope, that is, whether there are cost savings resulting 
from increased diversification of activities, or by indirect methods,  looking for how the 
market values  diversification (or mergers) of financial institutions.   
 
Leuven (2005) examines whether diversification of activities improves bank profitability 
and finds evidence of a diversification “discount”.  The study uses the ratio of operating 
income to assets as a measure of profits (while noting that higher profits measured in this 
way could mean higher excess profits, reflecting low levels of competition) and finds 
negative and significant effects of increased diversity (using both diversification in 
income flows and asset structures.  Leuven concludes that “operating income of banks 
that engage in multiple activities is much lower than if those banks were broken up into 
financial intermediaries that specialize in the individual activities.  The results are 
“consistent’ with the view that diversification intensifies agency problems in financial 
conglomerates with adverse implications on performance and these “costs” to 
diversification outweigh any benefits accruing from economies of scope.”  Leuven and 
Levine (2006) use market valuations to test a similar hypothesis and again confirm the 
discount.   
 
The development of integrated services, or its restriction, depends both on regulatory 
structures and on the market environment.  And regardless of the formal structure of 
regulation, the manner in which integrated providers behave will depend on the 
effectiveness of implementation of the regulation, the quality of supervision and on the 
response of market participants.  As Claessens notes (p 100)  “markets and regulators 
have dealt with conflict of interest issues within the same line of business or across 
businesses through reputation, voluntary codes and private standards, self-regulation, and, 
to some extent, government regulation and supervision.”   
 
A number of databases have compiled information on the regulatory regimes in place 
covering restrictions on financial institutions to engage in integrated service provision.  
IMF (2001) concludes that the majority of countries (in a survey of 54 countries) allowed 
full universal banking (see Table A1 in Appendix A).   The World Bank now has a 
database on over 150 countries regulatory structures.  Table A2 in Appendix A  has been  
compiled from a variety of these sources and shows the current situation in the Asian 
region.  As in other countries the majority of Asian countries now permit banks to engage 
in securities and insurance business.  There are more restrictions on engaging in real 
estate related business and some restrictions on bank-commerce links.  At a more detailed 
level Barth, Caprio and Levine score the content of the regulations in each area.  
Appendix Table A3 and A 4 shows the whole sample of countries they use and the 
detailed definitions in the scoring.  The Asian countries in the sample (Hong Kong, 
Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand) all scored in the range 2 to 3.5 which puts them in the higher range among the sample (i.e. more 
restrictive).   
 
Barth, Caprio and Levine, (2001 b) use these measures of restrictiveness to examine 
whether regulatory separation on banking and other activities has an effect on the 
development of markets or on bank performance.  While the techniques are somewhat 
basic, the simple regression results suggest no statistically robust connection between 
restrictions (or their removal) on the development of the size and depth of financial 
markets.  There is some evidence that restricting commercial banks from doing securities 
and real estate business causes an increase in net interest margins.  They interpret these 
results as indicating a negative effect on bank efficiency but there is controversy over the 
interpretation of net interest margins.  On the one hand low margins may indicate high 
funding costs while on the other they may indicate high lending rates – the former might 
imply inefficiency while the later might reflect monopoly profits and low competition.   
This latter interpretation would be more consistent with the findings of Laeven that 
diversification (i.e. the reduction of barriers to integrated services) would reduce earnings 
(the diversification discount).  This does throw some doubt on the Barth et al stronger 
statement that the more restrictions are placed on banks’ activities in the securities area 
the more inefficient banks are.  In their 2001c paper they are more circumspect and claim 
only mixed results on the relationship between restrictiveness and banking sector 
development and efficiency.   They also give results suggesting that restricting the mix of 
banking and securities increases the risk of banking crisis – so the benefits of diversifying 
risks, on their data, outweigh the risks of contagion across activities.  Clearly there is 
more research needed on these important questions.    
 
Part of the issue may be that the mere absence of preventive regulations does not 
guarantee that banks will take up the opportunity to diversify their activities. It is difficult 
to find direct tests of whether greater restrictiveness of formal regulations actually affect 
the extent to which banks engage in fee-based business or non-banking business
3.  
Demirguc-Kunt, Leuven & Levine  (2003)  show that banks engaging in fee-based 
activities tend to have lower margins, “consistent with – though not direct evidence of – 
cross-subsidization of bank activities”.  They also add evidence to the Barth et al finding 
that banking restrictions increase bank margins – and by substantial amounts :  
 “  in countries that restrict banks from engaging in nontraditional activities, such 
as securities underwriting, real estate, owning non-financial firms, and insurance, 
margins tend to be larger. The economic size of the effect is substantial. For 
instance, if Mexico had the same level of restrictions on activities as Korea (2.25 
instead of 3), this one-standard deviation drop in Activity restrictions would 
induce a full percentage point drop in net interest margins in Mexico according to 
regression 2 in Table 4 (0.75*1.4). Thus, a one-standard deviation  drop in 
Activity restrictions translates into 0.6 of a standard deviation drop in the net 
interest margin.” (p 18)   
 
With more careful analysis, however, they show that most of these effects disappear once 
the general quality of institutional structures (such as property rights and economic 
freedom) are accounted for.  They “ do not interpret these results as suggesting that bank regulations are unimportant for explaining bank margins. Rather, we interpret the 
findings as consistent with a strand of literature that emphasizes that policies and 
regulations stem from national institutions.”  Thus, national institutions that support 
private sector activity are likely also to support a less restricted and more efficient 
banking sector.   
 
 
Cross border banking activity   
 
In addition to the growth of cross-sector integration an important aspect, globally, and in 
East Asia, is the extent of integration of financial markets across borders.  The literature 
here is vast and growing and there is not space to describe it here.  The concensus view 
remains that economies in the region are not highly integrated with each others’ financial 
markets (despite the discussions of contagion after the financial crisis) and are more 
connected and integrated with global markets than with regional.  In the past, extra-
regional markets were a more important source of capital flows than internal.  One aspect 
however impacts on the regulatory and supervisory issues of concern here and that is the 
extent of cross-border operation of financial conglomerates.  As Table w shows,  there 
have been a significant numbers of cross-border banking investments in recent years and, 
where these groups continue to operate in multiple markets they pose additional 
regulatory and supervisory challenges.  This is clearly a subject for further research.   
 
TABLE 8  
 
Source:  Ghosh, 2006, Appendix 1, p 182 
 Section III 
What are the implications for financial regulators 
 
Financial regulators were faced with a number of challenges after the Asian financial 
crisis that would have been difficult enough to deal with even if the financial world had 
not been changing around them.  As described above, however, the global financial 
landscape has been changing and presents some challenges for regulators everywhere.   
 
Single versus Multiple Supervisors 
With the growth of integrated financial service provision and the wave of mergers 
creating large financial conglomerates, many countries have questioned whether the 
supervisory arrangements of previous decades are still appropriate.  The pace of financial 
innovation has increased, financial conglomerates are not only complex organizations to 
supervise but also change the way in which risk is transmitted within the financial system.  
As a result both the risks in the system and the regulatory objectives have become more 
complex.   
 
There is a considerable literature debating the pros and cons of single versus multiple 
regulators (cf World Bank, 2006; Cihak and Podpiera, 2006; Llewellyn 2006, Siregar and 
James, 2006,).  Most of the arguments are well summarized in the following table from 

























 TABLE 9  
 
Llewellyn ( 2006) notes that there are many variations of the model of unified agencies.  
He distinguishes integrated agencies from unified ones and from the twin peaks model.  
Integrated agencies supervise all types of financial institution and activity in one agency 
but may be limited in what aspects of the business they cover.  A unified agency, in his 
terminology, is one that covers not only prudential supervision but also “conduct-of-
business” supervision (i.e. consumer and investor protection issues such as disclosure, 
fairness etc).  There is, furthermore, a spectrum of agencies with some covering more 
than one, but not all, parts of the financial system (e.g. the Australian system where 
APRA supervises banking and insurance but not the securities industry).  The “twin 
peaks” model has two bodies, one to carry out prudential supervision and the other to do 
“conduct-of-business” supervision (consumer protection).   This model raises the 
question of whether the Central Bank should become the prudential supervisor across the 
whole financial system, which may have the risk that safety nets become extended to 
areas beyond those for which they were originally designed.  The question of what role 
should be played by the Central Bank is an important one, and particularly so in East Asia where many countries still rely on the CB for supervision, but not one that we 
explicitly address in this paper.   
 
A number of surveys indicate the very wide range of models around the world.  
Llewellyn gives the results shown in Table 10 from his own data (probably dated around 
2004-5) but notes that arrangements change rapidly and cannot always be easily 
interpreted because of local arrangements (such as local government powers).  Cihak and 
Podpiera, 2006,  give a different sample (for 2004) in which 33% have a single prudential 
supervisor, 6% an agency supervising banks and securities firms, 11% one supervisor for 
banks and insurers and 9% one for securities firms and insurers.  The remaining 44% 
have multiple sector supervisors.  Their data indicate the difficulty of accurately 
categorising arrangements since they classify Australia has having a single supervisor.  
Martinez and Rose, 2003, correctly categorize Australia and show a distribution (for 77 
countries in 2002) of 29% with a single supervisor, 8% doing banks and securities firms, 
13% doing banks with insurers, 9% doing securities firms and insurers and the remaining 
38% with multiple supervisors.   Thus, the majority of countries are still supervising 
separately but the striking feature is how varied is the international experience.   
Table  10 
Fully Integrated    39 
    Central Bank      9 
    Other    30 
Partially Integrated    23 
    Banks and Insurance      9 
    Banks and Securities      5 
    Insurance and Securities      9 
Separate    43 
TOTAL  105 
Source: Llewellyn, 2006  
 
Barth et al, 2006, note the increasing trend to integrated financial supervision but point 
out that interpretations of how to classify countries vary widely.  They give data based on 
regulators own responses to a World Bank survey but still have some doubts about the 
reliability of the data and note that researchers may disagree about appropriate 
classification because the legal details are often complex.  On their data, 11out of 32 
countries in the Asia Pacific region have a single supervisor for the financial sector.   
They also add to this picture the fact that some countries have multiple supervisors for 
one type of financial institution ( typically banks).  In their sample of 153 countries, 127 
had a single supervisor for banks while the remainder had multiple supervisors just for 
banks.   
 Within East Asia the picture is equally varied.  Appendix Table A5 (data based on 
primary sources where possible) gives details of East Asian supervisory arrangements.  



















Singapore(1984)          Yes 
    Malaysia 
(1988) 
    Y 
Japan (1998)           
Korea
e (1999)          N 
Taiwan
e (2004)          N 
        China 
e  N 
        Hong Kong  Y 
        Indonesia
a  Y 
        Philippines
b  Y 
        Thailand 
c,e  Y 
  Lao ? 
d        Y 
        Cambodia  Y 
        Vietnam  Y 
           
 Notes:  a)  Designing and debating a single regulator 
  b) Two banking supervisors 
  c) Banking supervisor also covers asset management and other financial services 
  d) Not clear where securities would be regulated 
  e) Barth et al, 2006, classifies these as having multiple bank supervisors 
Source:  See Appendix Table  
 
It seems that the division within the East Asian region is broadly along income lines, with 
the higher income group mainly having moved, mostly quite recently, to the integrated 
supervision model.   There are few studies of why countries choose integrated 
supervision.  Cihak and Podpiera report the results of a handful of studies that indicate 
that the main reasons for adoption have to do with the presence of conglomerates, the size 
of the economic system (larger systems are more likely to have integrated supervisors), a 
recent financial crisis, possibly some effect of the legal traditions (civil vs common law) 
and the role of the central bank (the more the central bank is involved the less likely to 
have integrated supervision because of the risk to safety nets).  Barth et al, 2006, provide 
a more elaborate political economy analysis of the choice of bank regulations (including, 
but not limited to, the choice of multiple vs single bank regulators but not extending to  
the issue of integrated supervision) and conclude that political institutional factors 
influence the choice of regulation but that angels do not yet govern.  Typically 
government-dominated regulatory systems do not enhance performance – systems that 
privilege market discipline over regulatory discipline perform best.    
Despite the considerable theoretical debate about the pattern of supervision, there are 
almost no empirical studies of the impact of integrated supervisors.  Chihak and Podpiera, 
2006, is a first attempt at assessing whether integrated supervisors have higher standards 
of supervision and have more consistent supervision across sectors.  They also consider 
the evidence for cost savings in integrated supervisors, measured by reduction in staff 
numbers.  Their results are suggestive but both the quality of data and the econometric 
methods are rudimentary and the results cannot be taken as robust.  They use the results 
of World Bank-IMF surveys on compliance with international standards represented by 
the Basel Core Principals, the IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation 
and the International Association of Insurance Supervisors Insurance Core Principals.  
The data is only partly public since countries are not obliged to reveal the results of the 
Financial Sector Assessment Programs.  They use 65 assessments, between the years 
2000-2002, and calculate indices of compliance with the overall codes and with 
components of the codes.  Using the overall compliance indicator as a quality index they 
give some basic regression results that suggest that there is very little impact of integrated 
supervision on quality.  In their sample, integrated supervision is much more common 
amongst high income countries and those with a generally good quality government 
regulatory environment.  Once these characteristics are accounted for there is little 
additional effect from integrated supervision. Similarly there is little effect on the 
consistency of supervision across different financial sectors (measured by the variation in 
particular aspects of compliance across different financial sectors) and there is little 
evidence of staff savings.   How much can be taken from these results for making 
judgements about the benefits of integration remains unclear.  The specification of the 
regressions is problematic and the results are not reported with enough detail to be 
meaningful.  The main impression is that we still know little about the effect of integrated 
supervisors.   
 
This partly explains why there is no consensus view about what system works best.  The 
present World Bank view is that different countries may well need (or be able to get by 
with) different systems.  Importantly they also stress that the transition from multiple, 
specialist supervisors to single, integrated supervisor is a complex process that can be 
costly and difficult (Martinez and Rose, 2003).  The results of Barth et al confirm that, 
more important than the organisational form of supervision,  a supervisory philosophy 
that favours a high quality regulatory environment (low corruption, transparency etc) and 
that supports private property rights, information transparency and market discipline are 
more important than the specifics of who regulates what and how.  Nevertheless, as risk 
and complexity in financial systems rise it seems likely that governments will continue to 
struggle with the choice of appropriate system and that the effects of those choices may 




Asia’s financial structures have changed since the financial crisis – in particular 
ownership structures have changed and are still changing 
 Markets have deepened and widened and there is a greater variety of products and 
services available. 
 
Financial conglomerates have always been a feature of some markets in the region and 
there is evidence of growth in the diversification of activities by banking sectors.  Thus 
the global trend to integrated financial service provision seems to occur in Asia.   
 
Regulations do not prohibit cross-sectoral activity in many countries in the region – many 
countries permit banks to engage in non-banking activity to varying degrees.  Overall the 
region falls in the mid-range of the degree of restrictiveness of its regulations. 
 
It is not clear, from international evidence, whether integrated financial services have 
positive impacts on the development of financial systems (depth etc) 
 
It is also not clear whether lower regulatory barriers on cross-section operation (e.g. 
prohibiting banks’ operation in securities or insurance business)  improve efficiency, 
development and soundness of financial systems.  Evidence is mixed but suggests that 
fewer restrictions, associated generally with less government interevention in markets, 
improve efficiency of banks.  At the firm level there is evidence of diversification 
discounts in financial conglomerates and of conflicts of interest.   
 
But the trend seems set regardless so there are supervisory issues that need to be 
addressed:  do integrated financial systems need integrated financial supervisors?  
Nobody knows.   Within the region there has been a movement towards integrated 
supervision, but there is still a divide between richer and poorer countries.  This could be 
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Source:  IMF, International Capital Market Report, 2001 
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2  Real Estate




North East Asia               
Japan  Permitted  Permitted  Prohibited  Restricted for non-financial 
firms 
 
S. Korea  Permitted but under a ceiling  Not permitted  Not Permitted                            
(except for its own use)  
Permitted but need to apply 
for approval 
 
China  Not permitted  Not permitted  Not Permitted                            
(except for its own use)  
Permitted in the form of 
special loans with the approval 
of the State Council 
 
Hong Kong  Permitted for 'Restricted 
Licence Banks' 
N/A  N/A                             N/A   
Taiwan  Permitted  Permitted  Permitted  Permitted   
                
South East Asia               
Indonesia  Permitted  Permitted  Not permitted  Not permitted   
Malaysia  Permitted  Permitted  N/A  Permitted but restricted   
The Philippines  Permitted for both Universal 
and Commercial Banks with 
limitations 
Permitted for both Universal 
and Commercial Banks with 
limitations 
Permitted with limitations 
for Universal banks only 
Permitted with limitations for 
Universal banks only 
 
Thailand  Permitted  Permitted  Permitted   Permitted but restricted   Singapore  Banks may hold equity 
participation in stockbrokering 
firms with MAS approval 
Locally incorporated banks 
may own insurance 
companies with MAS 
approval 
Limitted in the aggregate to 
20% of bank's capital 
Interests in the excess of 10%, 
or that give the bank 
significant influence over the 
management of a company, 
require regulatory approval. In 
addition, a bank may not 
invest more than 2% of its 
capital funds in any individual 
firm.  
 
                
Mekong Region               
Cambodia  Permitted  N/A  N/A  N/A   
Laos  Not permitted  N/A  N/A  N/A   
Viet Nam              Note: Foreign banks not 
subject to all domestic 
laws 
                
Note:  1/ Securities activities include underwriting, daling and brokering all kinds of securities and all aspects of the mutual fund business; 2/ Insurance 
activities include underwriting and selling insurance principal and as agent ; 3/ Real estate activities include real estate investment, development and 
management; 4/ Including investments through holding company structures. 
 
N/A: No information is available.   
Source: Information on all the South East Asian countries is from Siregar and James (2006); Japan -  Bank regulation and supervision, Caprio, Levine & 
Barth (2003), World bank database; China - Article 43 of 'Law of the People's Republic of China on Commercial Banks' (ref. the full document, titled 'Law of 
China's Commercial Banks is in the folder of the H-drive); Korea - 'Regulation on Supervision of Banking Business' (ref. the full document, titled 'Korea 
Supervisory Law' is in the folder of the H-drive); Hong Kong - (http://www.info.gov.hk/hkma/eng/bank/three_tier/three_tier_f.htm); Taiwan - Article 3 of 'The 
Banking Act of the Republic of China (ref. the full document with the same title is in folder of the H-drive; Cambodia - Article 2-4 of 'Law on Banking and 
Financial Institutions' (ref. the full document with the same title is in folder of the H-drive); Laos - Article 14 of 'Decree of the Council of Ministers pertaining 
to the Management and Operations of Commercial Banks and Financial Institutions' (ref. the full document, titled 'Laos Decree on Bank Operations' is in the 
folder of the H-drive);  
 
           
  
TABLE A3   Source:  Barth, Caprio, Levine, 2001,   TABLE A4 
 
Source;  Barth, Caprio and Levine, 2001, p 49 TABLE A5 
 
Asian Financial Sector Regulators, January 2007 
Regulator  Regulated 
Sector(s) 
About the Regulator  
Singapore (integrated)       




The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) was establied in 1984. 
One of MAS' objectives made clear in its organizational profile is to 
supervise the banking, insurance, securities and future industries. 
(http://www.mas.gov.sg/masmcm/bin/pt1Introduction_to_MAS.htm) 
Japan (integrated)       






The Financial Supervisory Agency (FSA) was established in 1998 as 
an administrative organization. It is responsible for the supervision of 
the banks, insurance, and securities businesses.  
(http://www.fsa.go.jp/en/about/about01_menu.html) 
Korea (integrated)       











The Financial Supervisory Service was created on January 2, 1999, 
under the Act on the Establishment of Financial Supervisory 
Organizations, with the merger of the Office of Bank Supervision of 
Bank of Korea, Securities Supervisory Board, Insurance Supervisory 
Board, and Korea Non-Bank Deposit Insurance Corporation.  
(http://english.fss.or.kr/fsseng/eabu/gov/msg.jsp?menuName=Govern
or&menuIndex=0) 











In order to promote an integrated financial supervision, the Financial 
Supervisory Commission was established on 1 July 2004. The 
primary objectives of the Commission are to consolidate the 
supervision of banking, securities and insurance sectors, and to act as 
a single regulator for all of these industries. 
(http://www.fscey.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=508412&CtNode=2225&mp
=5) 
Malaysia (partially integrated)       
1. Bank Negara Malaysia http://www.bnm.gov.my   banking 
and 
insurance 
Bank Negara Malaysia,  the central bank of Malaysia, was established 
in 1959. It is the regulator of the banking sector (Cihak and Podpiera 
2006). The insurance industry was brought under the supervision of 
BNM in 1988.  (http://www.bnm.gov.my) 




securities  The Securitiries Commission (SC) established in 1993 under the 
Securities Commission Act 1993, is a self-funding statutory body 
with investigative and enforcement powers. The SC's regulatory 
functions include, for example, to approve authority for corporate 
bond issues and to regulate all matters relating to securities and 
futures contracts.  (http://www.sc.com.my) 
China (separate)        
1. China Banking Regulatory Commission  
http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/mod_en00/jsp/en001000.jsp 
banking  The China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) was established 
in 2003. The CBRC issues licences for and undertakes examinations 
on banks, asset management companies, investment trust companies 
and non-banking financial institutions 
(http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/mod_en01/jsp/en010001.jsp). Before that, 
the People's Bank of China supervised the bankig sector (Cai 1999).  
2. China Securities Regulatory Commission 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/en/homepage/index_en.jsp 
securities  Created in 1998 as a minister-level organization, the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) oversees securities and futures 
markets; and investigates unfair transactions of listed companies, 
investment trust companies and investment advisory companies. 











insurance  The China Insurance Regulatory Commission (the “CIRC”), 
established on November 18, 1998, is authorized by the State Council 
to conduct administration, supervision and regulation of the Chinese 
insurance market, and to ensure that the insurance industry operates 
stably in compliance with law. 
(http://www.csrc.gov.cn/en/homepage/index_en.jsp) 
Hong Kong (separate)       
1. Hong Kong Monetary Authority 
http://www.info.gov.hk/hkma/eng/hkma/index.htm 
banking  The Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) was established in 
1993. One of its policy objectives is to promote the safety and 
stability of the banking system through the regulation of banking 
business and the business of taking deposits, and the supervision of 
authorised institutions 
(http://www.info.gov.hk/hkma/eng/hkma/index.htm) 
2. Securities and Futures Commission http://www.sfc.hk/sfc/html/EN/  securities  HKSFC is an independent statutory body established by the 
Securities and Futures Commission Ordinance (SFCO). It is 
responsible for administering the laws governing the securities and 
futures markets in Hong Kong. It regulates licensed corporations and 
individuals carrying out such regulated activities as dealing in 
securities, dealing in futures contracts, advising on securities, 
advising on futures contracts, advising on corporate finance, and 
securities margin financing.   









insurance  The responsibilities of the Office are (1) processing applications for 
authorization of general insurance business, (2) supervision of 
insurers carrying on general insurance business, (3) liaison with 
industry and professional bodies on matters relating to the regulation 
and development of the general insurance industry, (4)  
operation of the Government Terrorism Facility in respect of 
employees' compensation insurance, and (5) publishing insurance 
statistics on the Hong Kong general insurance market.   
(http://www.oci.gov.hk/about/index03.html) 
Indonesia (separate)       
1. Bank Indonesia    http://www.bi.go.id/web/en/  banking  The central bank as stated in Article 8 of Law 23/1999 is responsible 
for the tasks of regulating and supervising the banking sector (Siregar 
and James, 2004). 
2. Capital Market Supervisory Agency (BAPEPAM) 
http://www.bapepam.go.id/old/E_index.htm 
securities  According to the Law of the Republic of Indonesia No. 8 concerning 
the Capital Market, guidance, regulation, and day-to-day supervision 
of capital market is provided by Bapepam in order to implement an 
orderly, fair, and efficient capital market activities and protect the 
interests of investor and public (Siregar and James, 2004).  
3. The Ministry of Finance http://www.depkeu.go.id/Ind/  insurance  Articulated in the Articule 8 of Law 23/1999, the ministry of finance 
is responsible for the insurance sector (Siregar and James, 2004).  
Philippines (separate) (Guinigundo, 2006)       
1. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas                            (Central Bank of the 
Philippines)                            http://www.bsp.gov.ph/ 
banking  The Bangko Sentral has supervision over the operations of banks and 
exercises such regulatory powers as provided in the New Central 
Bank Act and other pertinent laws over the operations of finance 
companies and non-bank financial institutions performing quasi-
banking functions.  (http://www.bsp.gov.ph/banking/overview.asp) 
2. the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(http://www.pdic.gov.ph/) 
banking  Under the Department of Finance, the PDC is an insurer of deposits, 
co-regulator of banks, receiver and liquidator of closed banks.  
(http://www.pdic.gov.ph/mcv.asp#M) 3. Securities and Exchange Commission http://www.sec.gov.ph/  securities  The SEC was established on 26 Oct 1936 by virtue of the 
Commonwealth Act No. 83 or the Securities Act. Its major functions 
included registration of securities, analysis of every registered 
security, evaluation of the financial condition and operations of 
applicants for security issue, screening of applications for broker's or 
dealer's license and supervision of stock and bond brokers as well as 
the stock exchanges. The agency was abolished during the Japanese 
occupation and was replaced with the Philippine Executive 
Commission. It was reactivated in 1947.  
(http://www.sec.gov.ph/) 








insurance  Its mandate is to regulate and supervise the insurance industry in 
accordance with the provisions of the Insurance Code. It authorizes 
insurance companies and other insurance intermediaries to transact 
business in the country, it also conducts examinations for insurance 
agencies either by walk-in or periodically in designated testing 
centers. (http://www.insurance.gov.ph/htm/_about_mandate.asp) 
Thailand (separate)       
1. Bank of Thailand  
http://www.bot.or.th/bothomepage/index/index_e.asp 
banking  The Bank of Thailand started operations on December 10, 1942. The 
BOT supervises, monitors and examines the operations of 
commercial banks, financial and credit foncier companies, 
international banking facilities, asset management companies, non-
banks' credit card business and credit bureau to enhance the stability 
and transparency of the financial institutions system and to ensure 
that their operations meet internationally accepted standards.  
(http://www.bot.or.th/bothomepage/BankAtWork/AboutBOT/Respon
se/History/Response_E.pdf) 
2. Securities and Exchange Commission, Thailand             
http://www.sec.or.th/en/index.php 
securities  The Securities and Exchange Commission,Thailand was established 
in 1992 and performs the functions of the capital market supervisory 
agency with the status of an independent state agency.  The SEC was 
founded under the promulgation of the Securities and Exchange Act 
B.E. 2535.  (http://www.sec.or.th/en/misc/sec/aboutsec/intro_e.shtml) 3. The Insurance Department          http://www.doi.go.th/  insurance  Thailand's insurance regulator 
(http://www.nortonrose.com/html_pubs/view.asp?id=11239) 
Cambodia (separate) 
     
1. National Bank of Cambodia     http://www.nbc.org.kh/  banking  NBC was established in 1954. It supervises the banking system and 
its related activities.  (http://www.nbc.org.kh/law.asp?id=7#14) 
2. Securities and Regulations Working Committee  securities  There is no homepage found for this organization. It is documented in 
the link below 
http://law.utoledo.edu/students/financialregulators/asia.htm#CAMBO
DIA 









insurance  The Insurance Law articulates that the Ministry of Economy and 
Finance shall be responsible for the control and supervision of the 
insurance business. 
http://www.cambodiainvestment.gov.kh/law%20on%20Insurance.asp  
Laos (separate)       
1. Bank of the Lao P.D.R.          http://www.bol.gov.la/  banking  The Decree on Bank Operations dictates that all activities of a 
commercial bank and a financial institution (except the State 
Treasury, Pension Fund, Insurance Companies) shall be under the 
supervision and control of the Bank on the Lao PDR. 
(http://www.law.nyu.edu/centralbankscenter/texts/Laos;%20Commer
cial%20Banks.html) 
2. Insurance Department, Ministry of Finance 
http://www.laoembassy.com/news/laoorga.html 
insurance  There is no homepage found for this organization. It is documented in 
the link below 
http://law.utoledo.edu/students/financialregulators/asia.htm#LAOS 
3. No information is available for securities regulators.       
Vietnam (separate)       1. State Bank of Vietnam http://www.sbv.gov.vn/home/index.asp  banking  The English-version homepage is under construction. It is 
documented as below, 
http://law.utoledo.edu/students/financialregulators/asia.htm#VIETNA
M 
2. State Securities Commission of Vietnam 
http://www.ssc.gov.vn/ssc/defaulte.aspx?tabid=710) 
securities  The State Securities Commission (SSC) is an organization under the 
Ministry of Finance, charged with the functions of exercising the 
States regulation of securities and securities market, direct regulation 
and supervision of activities in securities and securities market, 
management of public services in the fields of securities and 
securities market in accordance with applicable laws. 
(http://www.ssc.gov.vn/ssc/Detaile.aspx?tabid=748) 
3. Department of Insurance, Ministry of Finance 
http://www.mof.gov.vn/DefaultE.aspx?tabid=197 
insurance  Source: 'Decision Promulgating the System of Supervisory Indicators 
for Insurers', http://www.mof.gov.vn/DefaultE.aspx?tabid=551(type 
'insurance' in 'Search for Content' box) 
 







                                                
1 A Swiss Re report of 2002 gives some indication of the size of the sector: (with papers on effects of consolidation) 
2 See also ICMR 2001 p 147 Economies of Scope Table 5.3  non int inc by size. P 143 
3 Claessens (2003) attributes to  Demirguc-Kunt, Leuven and Levine (2003) a result that severity of restrictions are negatively  
related to the share of non-fee income (p 117) which seems counter-intuitive but in fact that result is not contained in the cited paper  
(and I have not been able to find it in other work by these authors).  It appears that this has not been directly researched and seems to be an obvious area for further work 